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THE ROME STATUTE ON THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
FROM 1947- 2000 AND BEYOND©
By SHARON A. WILLIAMS, F.R.S.C.*

On 17 July 1998 the International Criminal Court
Statute was adopted in Rome by the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries. It will
become operative once sixty states have ratified. It will
have subject matter jurisdiction over genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and in the future
aggression once an appropriate definition has been
agreed upon. It is the culmination of work that began in
United Nations history in 1947. Its intent is to replace
the cycle of impunity for some of the most heinous
international crimes with accountability. The
philosophical and practical underpinnings of the ICC
are deterrence, prosecution and justice for victims. This
article explores the evolution of the ICC and then
concentrates on one of the most controversial issues,
the preconditions for the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction
over the listed crimes.

Le 17juillet 1998, le Statut de Rome de la cour p6nale
internationale a 6 adopts par la Confrence
diplomatique des plnipotentiaires des Nations Unies
sur la cr6ation d'une cour criminelle internationale, et
entrera en vigeur dds que 60 nations ratifient le statut.
La cour aura comp6tence en matidre de crime de
gdnocide, crimes de guerre, crimes contre l'humanit6
ainsi que le crime d'agression, ds que lon s'accorde sur
une d6finition appropride. La cr6ation de la Cour
intemationale de Justice repr6sente le point culminant
de nombreux travaux qui ont 6t6 entrepris par les
Nations Unies depuis 1947. Le cycle d'impunit6, qui
est une caract6ristique des crimes internationaux les
plus odieux, serait remplac6 par la notion de devoir
rdpondre A ses propres actes. Les fondements
philosophiques et pragmatiques de la CIJ sont la
dissuasion, les poursuites judiciaires et le besoin rendre
justice aux victimes. Cet article examine I'6volution de
la CIJ et se concentre sur la question la plus
controversde, soit les prdconditions n6cdssaires pour
que la CIJ puisse exercer sa compdtence sur les crimes
6numfrds.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I am very pleased and honoured to be a contributor to this
special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal in honour of my friend,
mentor, colleague and co-author Jean-Gabriel Castel. It was his
encouragement and forward thinking that fostered my interest, teaching
and writing on international criminal law over twenty-five years ago.
An independent, credible, just, and effective international
criminal court with broad state support is an imperative for the twentyfirst century.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established on 17
July 1998 in Rome by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court.1 It will have jurisdiction over some of the most serious
international crimes. Its value is not only in prosecuting and punishing
the alleged perpetrators of the listed crimes, genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity and potentially aggression, but also in its
capacity for deterrence. An impartial international criminal court with
an independent prosecutor's office must discourage those who seek to
instigate and perpetrate barbarous atrocities in violation of customary
1 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an

InternationalCriminal Court, 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. AICONF.183/9, online: United Nations
<www.un.org/law/icc/doc/n9828144.pdf> (date accessed: 17 August 2000) [hereinafter ICC].
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international and treaty law. The major challenge for the international
community is to make it truly effective and not merely symbolic.
It is impossible to turn back the clock and know what would have
happened had an international criminal court existed a century ago.
Would a real threat of prosecution together with enforcement capability
have made a difference to the course of history? In all likelihood the
answer is yes. In 1936, in a speech made at a Nuremberg rally, Adolf
Hitler addressed the perceived ineptitude on the part of states
collectively to take effective action against governments or individuals
for committing international crimes. In referring to the Armenian
holocaust, where Turkish officials allegedly killed over one and a half
million Armenians during the First World War, he asked rhetorically:
"Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of the
Armenians?" 2 A dangerous signal was sent to Hitler and subsequent
ruthless leaders when the Allied Powers failed to bring to justice those
allegedly responsible in Turkey. The underlying philosophy was that the
international community would do nothing and monstrous crimes could
be committed with impunity. Had strong, united, international
cooperation existed, perhaps Hitler in Germany and elsewhere in
Eastern and Western Europe, Idi Amin in Uganda, Pol Pot in
Cambodia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Kuwait, Radovan Karadzic and
Slobodan Milosevic in the Former Yugoslavia, Jean Kambanda in
Rwanda, Hiss~ne Habr6 in Chad, and Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone
may have been deterred from perpetrating the widespread and
systematic atrocities that the world has witnessed. These crimes
proscribed by customary and conventional international law attack the
very heart of what is civilized and the very foundation of human society.
The world community must be prepared to act. Should
deterrence fail it must be ready, willing and able to bring to justice those
accused, demonstrating that such conduct will not go unchallenged. It is
not a question of high-minded revenge, of the victors dictating their
terms to the vanquished, but rather a deep-rooted imperative to advance
the rule of law and to enhance the quality of human behaviour at the
national and international levels. The world community now knows that
it is not sufficient to act on an ad hoc basis. To do so requires the
selective political consent of the United Nations Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the Charterof the United Nations,3 and there is a
possibility that one of the five permanent members will veto the action.

2 J.F. Willis, Prologueto Nuremberg (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982) at 173.
3 26 June 1945, Can T.S. 1945 No. 7 [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
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Albeit, the Security Council's necessary actions in this way led to the
expeditious formation of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY)4 and Rwanda (ICTR),5 a permanent court
not hampered by geographical limits and time is necessary. However, the
ICTFY and the ICTR have clearly bolstered world interest in a
permanent international criminal court and are preparing the
groundwork through their cases for its operation. The ICC is
fundamental to international peace and security and the protection of
human rights and dignity. It will, it is to be hoped, promote international
stability by ending the cycle of violence and impunity and by deterring
future international crimes.
The philosophical and practical underpinnings for the ICC are
threefold. The triple function of the ICC is deterrence, prosecution of
alleged perpetrators, and justice for victims. The critical factor in the
establishment of the court is the capacity to enforce. The goal is to
replace impunity with accountability. However, there is also another
aspect and that is whether the individualization of guilt, especially in
ethnic conflicts within a single state, will assist in peace and
reconciliation between the troubled parties.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ICC
The establishment of an international criminal tribunal has been
on the international agenda since at least the time of the League of
Nations. Although examples of prosecution of war crimes and crimes
against peace may be found since the thirteenth century in Europe, 6 the
contemporary idea of establishing an international tribunal may be seen
to have stemmed from the 1899 first Hague Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes. The first allied attempt to

4 SC Res. 827, UN SCOR, 1993, Special Supp., UN Doc. S/25626 [hereinafter ICTFY].
5 Establishment of an InternationalTribunal and Adoption of the Statute of the Tribunal, Res.

955, UN SCOR, 1994, Special Supp., U.N. Doc. SIRES/955, online: United Nations
<www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/9443748e.htm> (date accessed: 17 August 2000) [hereinafter ICTR].
6 Note the trial and execution of Conradin von Hohenstaufen in Naples in 1262 for initiating
an unjust war, and the trial in 1474 of Peter of Hagenbach at Breisach for "tramp[ling] under foot
the laws of God and man." See G. Schwarzenberger, InternationalLaw as Applied by International

Courts and Tribunals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) at 462-66; M.H. Keen, The Laws
of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1965) 23-59; M.C Bassiouni & C.L.
Blakesley, "The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New International World Order"

(1992) 25 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 151; and L.C. Green, "Group Rights, War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity" (1993) 1 Int'l J. Group Rights 107.
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prosecute persons for war crimes occurred in 1919 in the Treaty of

Versailles.7 However, even though articles 227-29 provided for the

prosecution of the Kaiser Wilhelm II and other members of the German

armed forces, none were turned over to the Allied and Associated
Powers for prosecution. Instead, the Kaiser remained in the Netherlands
where he had sought asylum and other prosecutions were eventually,
through agreement with the Allies, heard by the German Supreme Court
in Leipzig.8
In 1937 there was an attempt by the League of Nations to bring
into operation a multilateral Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of Tenorism and an annexed Protocol9 on the establishment
of an international criminal court to deal with such offences. The
Convention and Protocol never came into force. Indeed the only state to
ratify was India.
Following the end of the Second World War, the Allied Powers

adopted the London Charter in 194510 and set up the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg. It provided a forum for the
prosecution of the major Axis war criminals whose crimes had no
particular geographical location. Others accused of war crimes were to
7 Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 28 June 1919, in Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923,
vol. 1 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924) 3. In 1919 a special
commission was set up by the Allied Powers to address, interalia, crimes against humanity. This was
of special significance due to the annihilation of one and a half million Armenians by Turkey.
Because of opposition by the United States, crimes against humanity were omitted from a list of
offences that an international tribunal would have been given to prosecute. In any event, although
the Treaty of Sivres, Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey, 10 August 1920, in Treaties of Peace,
1919.1923, vol. 2 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924) 789, provided for
the surrender of accused persons, the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne, Allied and Associated Powers
and Turkey, 24 July 1923, in Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923, vol. 2 (New York: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 1924), gave them amnesty.
8 See C. Mullins, The Leipzig Trials (London: H.F. & G. Witherby, 1921); and M.C. Bassiouni,
"Draft Statute International Tribunal" (1993) 10 Nouvelles Ettudes Penales 21. A demand had been
submitted to Germany by the Allied and Associated Powers for the trial of 901 persons. Germany
refused and the compromise reached was that the Allies agreed that Germany would prosecute a
selected number of alleged war criminals. Out of this number 45 names were selected. Of these only
13 were actually tried and six were acquitted. The heaviest sentence was four years of imprisonment.
See, for example, The Llandovery Castle Case (1921), [1923-24] Annual Digest of Public
International Law 436.
9 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 16 November 1937, in M.O.
Hudson, ed., 7 International Legislation 862 (Dobbsferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1972) [hereinafter
Terrorism Convention].
10 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter]; and Moscow
Declaration on General Security, 30 October 1943, in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47, (Lake
Success, N.Y.: United Nations, 1947).
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be sent back to the territory of the states where the crimes had been
perpetrated. A similar tribunal was set up in Tokyo' for the Far East
theatre of war. These courts were ad hoc tribunals for the trial of specific
persons within a determined time frame, that is, crimes committed
during the Second World War. They were not truly "international." At
Nuremberg, the judges and prosecutors were American, British, French,
and Russian. Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Charter, the Judgement, and
the Principles1 2 extrapolated therefrom by the International Law
Commission and accepted by the General Assembly are extremely
pertinent in terms of the definition of the offences of crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, as well as on other
issues such as individual criminal responsibility, superior orders and
command responsibility. Similarly, the decisions of the individual Allied
Military Tribunals acting under Control Council Order Number 10 and
national criminal courts are of assistance.
In 1947 the International Law Commission was set up by. the
United Nations General Assembly and it was given the mandate to
formulate the Nuremberg Principles, 13 to prepare a draft code of
offences against the peace and security of mankind and "to study the
desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ
for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes." The
International Law Commission concluded that to do so was both
desirable and possible. As a result, in 1950 the General Assembly
established a Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, to
prepare a concrete proposal for such a court. A draft statute was
submitted in 1951 and amended in 1953. The 1953 draft statute was not
accepted because of a failure to agree on a definition of "aggression."
This is not surprising in the context of the cold war, in that an
international criminal court mandated to include aggression as a crime
was seen as a threat to national sovereignty and security. The General
Assembly did adopt by consensus a definition of aggression in 1974.14
However, it would not be until 1982 that the International Law
Commission would return to the subject.
11 See Proclomationof General OrderNo. I by the Supreme Allied Commander, 19 January
1946, am. 26 April 1946. T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
12
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N.
Doc. A/1316 (1950), 11-14.
13

Establishmentof an InternationalLaw Commission, GA Res. 174(11), UN GAOR, 2nd Sess,,
UN Doe. A/519 (1947).
14 Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314, UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, UN Doc.
A/9631 (1974).
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During the period that the International Law Commission's
project was lying dormant, the 1973 InternationalConvention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheidi5 was adopted.
Article V provided, inter alia, for an international penal tribunal. It came
into force in 1976, but no such tribunal was ever set up. As well, no
Western state ratified it.16
Another crime-specific attempt occurred at the 1989 fall United
Nations General Assembly1 7 and at a special session in 1990 concerning
the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. With Trinidad and Tobago assuming a
leadership role, fifteen Caribbean and Latin American states supported
the establishment of an international criminal court. However, the
majority of Western states were opposed at that time and consequently
the only result was that the General Assembly mandated the
International Law Commission to continue its work on the topic.
The question that immediately comes to mind is why it has taken
so long for the international community to agree on the need to establish
an international criminal court? Amongst the apparent obstacles were a
reluctance to yield up any element of sovereignty to an international
tribunal, nationalistic pride in the superiority of domestic criminal law,
reticence to participate in establishing another international institution,
problems of obtaining consensus on subject matter jurisdiction,
applicable substantive and procedural criminal law rules, issues relating
to recognition and enforcement of judgments and the cost.
The urgency of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, in
particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including reports of mass killings,
systematic detention, and rape of women and so-called "ethnic
cleansing," necessitated immediate action. On 22 February 1993 the
Security Council decided that an international tribunal should be
established for the prosecution of persons allegedly responsible for
committing such crimes since January 1991. The report of then
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali on 3 May 1993 recommended
that immediate action on an ad hoc basis was needed and that the
tribunal should therefore be established by a decision under Chapter VII

15 GA Res. 3068, UN GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).

16 See the account by Bassiouni, supra note 8 at 8, of the attempt to establish such a tribunal
and the then lack of political will to do so by "Western" states.
17 InternationalCriminalResponsibility of Individuals and Entities Engaged in Illicit Trafficking
in Narcotic Drugs Across National Frontiers and Other Transnational Criminal Activities:
Establishmentof an InternationalCriminalCourt with Jurisdictionover such Crimes, GA Res. 44/39,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A1RES/44/49 (1989), online: United Nations
<www.un.org/gopher-data/ga/recs/44/49> (date accessed: 17 August 2000).
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of the U.N. Charter. This measure was taken to maintain or restore
international peace or security, following the determination of the
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and it was therefore effective immediately. It bound member
states to take whatever action was required. On 25 May 1993, by
resolution 827, the Security Council established the Tribunal and
endorsed the thirty-four article statute annexed to the
secretary-general's report. 18 The precedent of the former Yugoslavia
Tribunal facilitated the establishment by the Security Council on 8
November 1994 by resolution 955, acting again under Chapter VII of the
ad hoc ICTR.19
The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda clearly represent an attempt by the United Nations to establish
neutral fora for the prosecution of crimes of such magnitude. However,
they have a limited mandate, and deterrence of future genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity have demanded a permanent global
international criminal court.
An important step forward occurred in December 1994 when the
General Assembly formed an ad hoc committee to review the
fundamental issues, both substantive and administrative, arising out of
the ICC draft statute prepared by the International Law Commission. It
recommended that a Preparatory Committee open to all United Nations
member states be set up to draft a statute text which would be widely
acceptable. The Preparatory Committee held several meetings in 1996
and 1997 and had its final meeting in March 1998. The Diplomatic
Conference was held in Rome from 15 June to 17 July 1998 to consider
and finalize the Rome Statute provided for in the Preparatory
Committee's negotiating text.
III. ROME 1998-THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK
On the evening of 17 July 1998 in Rome, the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court drew to a climatic end after, five solid
weeks of intense negotiations, political posturing and, finally,
accommodations being struck. Under the rules of procedure, the Rome
Statute had to be adopted by midnight. The atmosphere of the chamber
where the Committee of the Whole sat was charged with anticipation
18

ICTFY,supra note 4.

19

Supra note 5.
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and increasing excitement. Would this happen? The answer was
resoundingly-yes! Amendments of any description at that last stage
would have collapsed the intricately woven package. Still, the tension
heightened as first India and then the United States made last ditch
attempts to push for acutely controversial amendments. 20 These were
defeated in short order by no-action motions.2 1 As the meeting was
brought to a close the whole room erupted into a celebration fraught
with high emotion, an extraordinary sight at a diplomatic conference.
This was indeed an historic moment for international criminal
law, cooperation and human rights. It was also an amazing feat, in that
when the conference opened on 15 June 1998 it had to deal with a
negotiating text which had approximately 1,400 square brackets
indicating bones of contention, some fundamental. The conference
achieved the impossible in many ways. Among the key successes of the
conference were firstly, the inclusion of automatic jurisdiction over the
core crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and
aggression, although the latter still has to be defined.22 Secondly, there is

20 See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/94-95, 17 July 1994, for the text of the amendments; and
R.S. Lee, "Introduction: The Rome Conference and Its Contributions to International Law," in
R.S. Lee, ed., The InternationalCriminalCourt The Making of the Rome Statute (The Hague: KJuwer
Law International, 1999) 1 at 24-26, where he discussed the procedural no-action motion in this
way. A no-action motion was not specifically mentioned in the Rules of Procedure of the Rome
Conference. However, in the practice that has emerged in the United Nations General Assembly,
the procedural rule under which such a motion is placed is that dealing with the rule regarding
adornment of the debate, Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the Rome Conference.
21 Under no-action motions, instead of voting on the substance of the proposed amendments
to the draft Statute, the vote was on whether states agreed with no action being taken on the
amendments. Thus, a formal vote was not taken on the amendments themselves. The no-action
motion on the Indian amendments was proposed by Norway and adopted by a vote of 114 in favour
to 16 against with 20 abstentions; it had concerned adding the use of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction to the list of war crimes and abrogating the role of the U.N. Security
Council to refer situations to the ICC or to request the court to defer investigation or prosecution
where the Council adopted a resolution, both of which issues had been the subject of intense
negotiations during the five weeks. The United States proposed amendment concerned article 12 of
the draft statute, the preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC and a focal point of
controversy in Rome. The United States was insistent that the ICC should only be able to take
jurisdiction where the accused's state of nationality had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.
Again, Norway proposed a no-action motion, which was adopted by 113 in favour to 17 against with
25 abstentions.
22 In accordance with article 5(2), aggression will be within the jurisdiction of the Court once a
provision has been adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 of the statute, which deal with
amendments by the Assembly of States Parties or by a Review Conference: ICC, supra note 1, article
5(2). Article 121(1) provides that after seven years following the entry into force of the statute any
state party may propose amendments thereto: ibid., article 121(1). Under article 121(3) any
amendment requires a two-thirds majority of the states parties unless consensus can be reached:
iba, article 121(3). By article 121(5), any amendment to article 5, which includes, therefore, the
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the specific inclusion as crimes against humanity of crimes of sexual
violence such as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy when committed as part of a widespead or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population 23 or as war crimes in
international conflicts24 and internal conflicts. 25 Thirdly, the statute
applies not only to international armed conflicts but also to internal
conflicts that meet the threshold test of being more than internal
tensions, riots or sporadic acts of violence. 26 Fourthly, there is provision
for impartial investigations and an independent prosecutor who may
initiate them proprio motu with certain inbuilt checks and balances. 27
Thus, the prosecutorial scheme does not depend solely on the initiation
of investigations and consequent prosecutions by states parties 28 and the
United Nations Security Council. 29 Fifthly, there are provisions for due
process for the accused 3Oand victims' rights31 Lastly, there are rigorous
qualifications for judges, 32 no statute of limitations, 33 and no
reservations are allowed 3 4
The ICC is not intended to be a global court of international
human rights where, as with the European Court of Human Rights or
even the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, individuals seek
redress and usually legislative change in the respondent state. What it
will provide is a vehicle for deterrence and prosecution. As well, it will
definition of aggression, shall enter into force only for those states parties which have accepted the
amendment one year after they have ratified or accepted: ibid., article 121(5). It provides further
that the Court shall not exercise jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by an amendment, with
respect to a state party that has not accepted the amendment regarding such a crime committed by
that state party's nationals or on its territory. Work on defining aggression, its elements and the
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC has begun at the Preparatory Commission (to
be contrasted with the earlier Preparatory Committee) set up in accordance by a resolution at the
Rome Conference and continues as of October 2000.
23
IbL, article 7(1)(g) read in accordance with article 7(2)( 0 .
24

1bd., article 8(2)(b)(xxii).

25Ibid., article 8(2)(e)(vi).
26

Ibid., article 8(2)(e) read in accordance with article 8(2)(d).

27

1bid., article 15.

28

1bid., article 14.

29

Ibid, article 13(b).

30

Ibid., articles 66-67.

31 bid, article 68.
32

1bid, article 36.

33

Ibid., article 29.'

34

1bid, article 120.
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be a forum for assuaging the mental and physical wounds of the victims
by providing justice, and for reparation, arguably leading to national
reconciliation. It is hoped that the providing of accountability and
ending impunity will promote peace and protect the fundamentals of
human dignity.
It would be naive to suggest that there are not certain weakness
in the statute. There are. Certain states and most NGOs pressed for the
ICC to have universal jurisdiction or a variant thereof, over the listed
crimes, but the result at the end of the day was restrictive preconditions
in the final text of article 12. In fact, until the proverbial eleventh hour in
Rome, article 12 was a make or break provision, and it still today retains
its notoriety. It is where the remaining concentration of this article lies.
Article 12 deals with the preconditions for the actual exercise of
jurisdiction. It is fundamental to the effective functioning of the ICC.
The views of states were wide ranging. Article 12 is intimately related to
article 5 regarding crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC,35 article 13
on exercise of jurisdiction 3 6 article 17 on complementarity 3 7 and article
124 on the transitional provision.38 In effect, these provisions dealing
with the intertwined aspects of jurisdiction "were the most complex and
most sensitive, and for that reason remained subject to many options as
long as possible." 3 9 They "gave rise to some of the most difficult
negotiations at the Rome Conference ...
and were among the very last
40
to be settled." They were, beyond doubt, indicative of the necessity to
adopt a package-deal. The approach taken is: firstly, that the offence
ratione materiae is found in the list of core crimes contained in article 5
and defined in articles 6, 7, and 8; secondly, the case must be initiated in
accordance with the provisions of article 13; and, thirdly, the
35 See A. Zimmerman, "Article 5" in 0. Trifterrer, ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute
(Bader-Bader: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999) 97; and H. von Hebel & D. Robinson, "Crimes
Within the Jurisdiction of the Court" in R.S. Lee, supra note 20,79.
36 See S.A. Williams, "Article 13" in 0. Trifterrer, supra note 35, 343; S. Ferndndez de
Guremndi, "The Role of the International Prosecutor" in R.S. Lee, supra note 20, 175; L. Yee,
"The International Criminal Court and The Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16" in R.S. Lee,
supra note 20, 143; and F. Lattanzi, "The Rome Statute and State Sovereignty, ICC Competence,

Jurisdictional Links, Trigger Mechanism" in F. Lattanzi & W. Schabas, eds., Essays on the Rome
Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt, vol. 1 (Ripa Fortara Alto: il Sirente, 1999) 51.
37 See S.A. Williams, "Article 13" in 0. Trifterrer, supra note 35 at 383; and J.T. Holmes,

"The Principle of Complementarity" in R.S. Lee, supra note 20, 79.
38 See A. Zimmerman, "Article 124" in 0. Trifterrer, supra note 35, 1281.
39 P. Kirsch & J.T. Holmes, "The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The
Negotiating Process" (1999) 93 A.J.I.L. 2 at 8.
40 E. Wilmshurst, "Jurisdiction of the Court" in R.S. Lee, supranote 20, 127.
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preconditions for the ICC exercising jurisdiction in the specific case
must be met.
From the draft statute of the International Law Commission, 41
to the draft statute prepared by the Preparatory Committee 42 and finally

to the negotiations at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court in Rome from 15 June to 17 July 1998,43 a fundamental question
remained in all stages of the debate. This question related to cases other
than those referred to the prosecutor by the United Nations Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.44 In such cases,
would the ICC have inherent jurisdiction to prosecute the core crimes
listed in article 5 on account of ratification or acceptance of the statute?
Alternatively, would state consent be a precondition to jurisdiction and
if so for which crimes, on what basis, and by which state or states?
IV. ARTICLE 12-THE ROAD TO ADOPTION
A. The ILC Draft
I

The 1994 draft statute45 for an international criminal court
produced by the International Law Commission was complex, and it was
geared towards producing a court that would operate on a restrictive
consent basis with strict Security Council control under article 23.
Article 21(1)(a) provided for inherent jurisdiction in a case of genocide,

41 Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Session, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), online: United Nations
<www.un.org/gopher-dataga/recs49/9450057e.txt> (date accessed: 17 August 2000) [hereinafter
ILC Draft].
42 Report of the PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminalCourt,
U.N. Doc. AICONF.18312lAddl (1998), online: United Nations <www.un.orgllawlicc
/n9810105.pdf> (date accessed: 17 August 2000).
43 See Bureau Discussion Paper, Part 2 (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Apllicable Law),
Committice of the Whole, U.N. Doc. AICONF.1831C.IL53, 6 July 1998, 11- 12 [then article 7]; and
Bureau Proposal,Part 2 (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law), Committee of the Whole,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59, 9 July 1998, 10-12 [then articles 7 bis and 7 ter].
44 See Charterof the United Nations and Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, article
13(b), in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1996, E.K. Flynn-Connors, ed., (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1998) 1449.
45 ILC Draft,supranote 41.
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with no additional requirement of acceptance. 46 However, article
21(1)(b) stipulated a type of "ceded jurisdiction" 4 7 for crimes other than
genocide referred to in article 20, including aggression, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and certain treaty crimes. 4 8 In cases of these
crimes, the court could exercise jurisdiction where the complaint was
brought in accordance with article 25(2), by a state party which had
accepted the jurisdiction of the court over the particular crime under
article 22, that is, by the custodial state and by the state in the territory of
which the act or omission in question occurred. The crimes listed were,
therefore, broader than article 5 of the Rome Statute. As well, in a case
where the custodial state had received a request 49 under an international
agreement from another state to surrender a person for the purposes of
prosecution, unless the request was rejected, the acceptance by the
requesting state was required. Under article 22, the International Law
Commission draft statute detailed the modalities of acceptance by states
parties. It can be classified as an "opting in" system with states specifying
the crimes for which jurisdiction was accepted.0 The court did not have
inherent jurisdiction, therefore, based on a state ratifying or acceding
but needed a special declaration by a state either at the time of
becoming a party or at a later stage. The International Law Commission
was of the view that this best reflected its general approach to the court's
jurisdiction,Sl that it is based on state consent with the "Court
intervening upon the will of the States concerned, rather than whenever
46 The complaint was to be brought under ibid.,
article 25(1), by a state party which was also a
contracting party to the 1948 Convention on the Preventionand Punishmentof the Crime of Genocide,
12 January 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, as envisaged by article 4.
47 It must, however, be recognized that the ILC Draft, supra note 41, reduced the conditions

for the exercise of jurisdiction set out in its earlier 1993 Draft: see Report of the InternationalLaw
Commission on the Work of its Forty-fifth Session, UN GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc.

A/48/10 (1993); J.Crawford, "The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal"
(1994) 88 A.J.I.L., 140; C. Warbrick, "Current Developments: Public International Law" (1995) 44

Int'l and Comp. L.Q.466; and C.L. Blakesley, "Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes and Triggering
Mechanism" (1997) 13 Nouvelles ttudes Penales 177 at 204.

48 Article 20(e) and annex. Examples included the anti-terror/violence conventions such as the
1970 Hague Conventionfor the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1972 Can. T.S. No 23; and
the 1988 U.N.Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and PsychotropicSubstances, 1990
Can. T.S. No. 42.
49

ICC,supra note 1, article 21(2).

50

See supra note 41, "Commentary to Article 22." In the 1993 Draft, the ILC Working Group

had proposed two alternatives to this article, which were based on "opting out": ibid. Under the
"opting out" approach, the court's jurisdiction would have been accepted by all states parties except

for those crimes expressly designated.
51 Ibid
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required for protecting the interests of the international community." 52
Article 23(1) provided for referral to the court by the United Nations
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charterfor crimes
referred to in article 20. With respect to aggression, article 23(2)
detailed the prerequisite that the Security Council determine that a state
had committed aggression before a complaint of, or directly related to,
an act of aggression could be brought. In conclusion, the consent regime
in the International Law Commission draft statute was criticized as
being "complicated and cumbersome at best,"5 3 and likely "to cripple
the proposed Court at worst."5 4 However, it is clear from statements
made by states over the years in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the
General Assembly during the debate on the annual report of the work of
the International Law Commission that the International Law
Commission was cognizant that the "instrument providing for an
international criminal jurisdiction [had to] take into account [then]
current international realities ...
that the establishment and effectiveness

of the court required the broad acceptance of the statute by States."55
B. The PrepCom Draft
In both the Ad Hoc Committee 56 set up by the United Nations
General Assembly to review the International Law Commission 1994
draft statute and in the Preparatory Committee established in 1996,57
the same fundamental questions were raised. In the Preparatory
Committee there was widespread, albeit not uniform, agreement that

52 M. Politi, "The Establishment of an International Criminal Court at a Crossroads: Issues
and Prospects After the First Session of the Preparatory Committee" (1997), 13 Nouvelles Etudes
PMnales 115, 149. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee U.N. GAOR, 50th Session, Supp. No, 22,
U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).
53 L.S. Wexler, "First Committee Report on Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes and
Complementarity" (1997) 13 Nouvelles Etudes Pnales 163 at 173.
54

Ibid.

55 Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Session, UN
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doe. A/49/10 (1994) 31, para. 48.
56

Establishmentof an InternationalCriminalCourt, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, UN
Doe. A/RES/49/53, 9 December 1994, online: United Nations <www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49
/a49r053.htm> (date accessed: 16 August 2000).
57
Establishmentof an InternationalCriminalCourt, UN GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49, UN
Doe. A/RES/50/46 (1995), online: United Nations <www.un.orgllaw/icc/gares/50_46.htm> (date
accessed: 17 August 2000).
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there should be inherent jurisdiction over genocide.5 8 However, as in the
Ad Hoc Committee, there were different views on whether war crimes
and crimes against humanity should be so treated.9 The states that
supported inherent jurisdiction for all core crimes underscored the need
for it because of the gravity of the crimes. On the other hand, the states
that were opposed to inherent jurisdiction stressed the consensual
nature of the court and the necessity of the International Tribunal
obtaining maximum state support. The maintenance of state sovereignty
was key to this position. In fact, some states argued that the
preconditions of state consent set out in article 21(1)(b) of the 1994
International Law Commission draft statute should have been more
expansive including also the mandatory consent of the states of
nationality of the accused and the victim.
In the draft report of the Intersessional Meeting in Zuphten, 60
which was produced to facilitate the last Preparatory Committee session,
the options on jurisdictional preconditions were contained in articles 6
[21] and 7 [21 bis] as produced by the Working Groups of the
Preparatory Committee. 61 The articles had square brackets indicating
various alternatives and the diverse views of states.
C. Rome 1998-The Options
Several options contained in the draft statute, 62 finalized at the
last session of the Preparatory Committee on 3 April 1998, were put
before delegations in the Committee of the Whole. Broadly speaking
these options can be categorized as "the German Proposal," "the United
Proposal," "the opt-in" regime, the
Kingdom Proposal," "the Korean
"case-by-case" consent regime, 63 and "the United States' Proposal."
These proposals ranged from inherent universal jurisdiction for the ICC
58 Report of the PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminalCourt,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Session, Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/51/22, vol. 1, para. 120.
59 See Politi, supra note 52, 149-50.
60

Report of the Inter-sessionalMeetingfrom 19 to 30 January1998 in Zutphen, the Netherlands,
UN GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13 (1998).
61 Report of the Inter-sessionalMeetingfrom 19 to 30 January1998 in Zutphen, the Netherlands,
UN GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC.24911997/L.8/Rev. 1 (1997).

62 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, articles 6(b), 7, 9 (further option), and further option for
article 7.
63 For a useful background paper, see International Commission of Jurists, "Exercise of
Jurisdiction and Complementarity" I.C.J. Brief No. 2 June 1998 [hereinafter ICI BriefJ.
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proposed by Germany and a broad jurisdictional basis at one end of the
spectrum, to the restrictive mandatory tonsent of all interested states
proposed by some delegations at the other. The Bureau Discussion
Paper tried to narrow the options and its subsequent proposal likewise
did so, while still retaining alternatives. 64 The final package struck a
compromise. Nevertheless, the then entrenched positions of some
delegations proved to be irreconcilable. The result was that the
consensus approach to adoption was thwarted and an unrecorded vote
was called for late on 17 July 1998 by the United States. Article 12 as
adopted is not as restrictive as it could have been but it still provides for
special requirements where the prosecutor acts proprio motu, or where
states, rather than the United Nations Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,refer a situation to the prosecutor.
These require party status for either the territorial state that is the locus
of the crime or the state of nationality of the accused parties, unless nonstate parties have accepted the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.
1. The German Proposal
It is a well-established rule of customary and conventional
international law that certain criminal conduct is against the universal
interest, offends universal conceptions of public policy and is universally
condemned. The perpetrators are viewed as hostis humanis generis,
enemies of humankind, and any state which obtains custody over them
has a legitimate ground to prosecute in the interest of all states on
account of universal jurisdiction over the offence, even if the state itself
has no direct connection with the actual crime. Thus, jurisdiction over
the person and jurisdiction over the offence are merged. 65 In this way
such heinous crimes will not escape justice by falling into a jurisdictional
vacuum. There is no requirement of consent by any other states involved
in some way through territorial location of the crime, nationality of the
accused or victims. The origins of the principle of universal jurisdiction
can be traced to international piracy, 66 the slave trade, 67 and more
64 Kirsch & Holmes, supra note 39 at 9.
65 See H. Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes" (1944) 21
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 58 at 61.
66 As to the right of every state to seize a pirate ship or aircraft on the high seas or otherwise
outside the jurisdiction of any state and arrest the persons on board, see UnitedNations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 7 October 1982, A/CONF.62/122, article 19, in U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea 1982, K.R. Simmonds, ed. (Dobbsferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1983) [hereinafter Law of the Sea];
(1982) 21 1.L.M. 1245, The SS Lotus case (1927), P.C.I.J. Series A, No 10, 70 per Justice Moore; and
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recently to war crimes, crimes against humanity,6 8 and genocide. 6 9 The
prosecutions before the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda illustrate this fundamental principle.
For example, as explained in the amicus curiae brief presented by the
United States of America in the Tadic case 70 :
The relevant law and precedents for the offences in question here-genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity-clearly contemplate international as well as national action
against the individuals responsible. Proscription of these crimes has long since acquired
the status of customary international law, binding on all states, and such crimes have

Re PiracyJure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (Sp. Ref. J.C.P.C.).
67 See L.C. Green, InternationalLaw: A CanadianPerspective, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Carswell,
1988) at 212. The assimilation of the slave-trader to the pirate probably stems from the fact that
slave trading was declared by an Imperial Statute of the British Parliament to be piracy: An Act to
Amend and Consolidate the Laws Relating to the Abolition of the Slave Trade (1824), 5 Geo. IV, c.
113, s. 9. See R. v. Zulueta, 1 Cox C.C. 20 (Central Crim. Ct.); and LeLouis (1817), 2 Dods. 210.
There is no indication that the Slavery Convention, 25 September 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, as amended
by the Protocol, 7 December 1953, 182 U.N.T.S. 51, or the Supplementary Convention of 1956,
Can.T.S. No. 7, subjected alleged perpetrators to universal jurisdiction. But for rights of visit on the
high seas of suspected slave-trading steps, see Law of the Sea, supra note 66, 70, article 110(1)(b).
68 As with war crimes, the IMT had jurisdiction over crimes against humanity: see IMT
Charter, article 6(c). However, because of the grammatical construction the IMT restricted its
jurisdiction to crimes against humanity connected to the conduct of the war: Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the InternationalMilitary Tribunal, vol. 1, 17; Secretary General of the United
Nations, "Memorandum: The Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal" (1949) 66.
Conversely, prosecutions by the Allied Military Tribunals acting under Control Council Order No.
10 were not so restricted: see Alstoetter et aL "The Justices Trial" (1947), 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1 at 45-46.
Domestic consideration includes Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann (1961), 36 I.L.R. 18 at 39
(Dist. Ct.), aff'd (1962), 36 I.L.R. 277 at 304 (Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter Eichmann]; Demjanjuk v.
Petrovky et aL (1985), 776 F. 2d 571 at 582 (U.S.C.A., Sixth Cir.); FedirationNationale des Diportis
et Intemrs Rsistants et Patrioteset al. v. Barbie (1983), 78 I.L.R. 125 at 130 (Cass. Crim.); andR. v.
Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701. See also: Apartheid Convention, supra note 15, article 4; and Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment,1987 Can. T.S. No.
36, article 5(2).
69 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, article 4 does not provide for universal jurisdiction per se, but for jurisdiction
by the state where the offence was committed or by an international penal tribunal. However, the
Convention does not prohibit states from using other bases of jurisdiction and it has been argued
that universal jurisdiction may be exercized on the basis of customary international law. As to what
is not prohibited, see the SS Lotus Case (France v. Turkey) supra note 66, 70. Concerning genocide
as a crime under customary international law, see Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion) [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 15 at 23; Case
Concerningthe Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970] I.C.J.
Rep. 4 at 32; U.N.G.A. Res. 961; Eichmann,supra note 68; and American Law Institute, Restatement
of the Law (Third) ForeignRelations Law of the United States (1987), Reporter's Note on §404, 256.
Note L.R. Beres, "Genocide and Genocide-Like Crimes" in M.C. Bassiouni, ed., International
CriminalLaw: Crimes, vol. 1 (1986) 271 at 275.
70 The Prosecutorof the Tribunal v. Dusan Tadic (Case No. IT-94-I-T) 20, 25 July 1995, as
quoted in ICI Brief,supra note 63 at 5.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 38 No. 2

already been the subject of international prosecutions by the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals.

The German proposal centred on the proposition that if states
individually have a legitimate basis at international law to prosecute the
core crimes listed in article 5 on account of universal jurisdiction, then
the ICC should not have the same capacity as contracting states. By
adopting this proposal, states would have given to the ICC only the
rights that they themselves had. This was determined to be appropriate
for a permanent international criminal court being founded for the good
of the international community of states as a whole. This proposal was
contained in article 9(1), which was a further option of the Draft Statute
before the Committee of the Whole.
The German proposal attracted strong support from some
delegations 7l and from many of the NGOs.72 The view central to this
proposal was that to limit the potential of the ICC by requiring some
form of state consent beyond ratification would detract from the
effectiveness of the court and even its rationale and philosophical
underpinnings. Thus, the impact of the German proposal would have
been to give the ICC inherent jurisdiction 73 over the listed crimes with
no need for a separate consent of interested states. As Germany
indicated, 74 the universal principle's application would eliminate
loopholes. For example, if consent of the territorial state was necessary
and if genocide was committed in State X against nationals of State X
and X is not a party to the statute and the United Nations Security
Council does not refer the matter to the ICC acting under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter,75 the crime would not be within the jurisdiction of
the court. Similarly, it is true that in the case of internal armed conflicts
that the territorial state and state of nationality will often be one and the

71 The Rome Treaty Conference Monitor,10 July 1998, 1-2 [hereinafter Conference Monitor].
72 For example, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Commission of
Jurists, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch.
73 Note that Germany also called this "the German version of automatic jurisdiction":
statement by H.-P. Kaul, Acting Head of the German Delegation in the CW, 9 July 1998, 1. Thus,
Germany used "inherent" and "automatic" to mean that the ICC was vested with universal
jurisdiction upon ratification by states. This must be contrasted with the term "automatic" as used in
the Korean Proposal, the United Kingdom Proposal, the Bureau Proposal, and in the final text of
the statute where although acceptance of the court's jurisdiction is required in different manners it
does not require a second state consent as do the opt-in and state consent regimes.
74 Statement by H.-P. Kaul, Acting Head of the German Delegation, Rome Conference, 19
June 1998.
75 ICC, supra note 1, article 13 (b).
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same. The ICC would have jurisdiction only if that state had long before
the conflict become a state party or, if not, through political domestic
parties agreeing ad hoc or, again, if the Security Council acted under
Chapter VII.76 As well, the restrictions of state consent would mean that
even where the custodial state was a party to the Rome Statute and
wanted to surrender the accused to the ICC, the court would not be able
to exercise jurisdiction without the consent of the other involved states.
If the German proposal had been marketable in Rome, the end
result would have been the deletion of article 12 (article 7 in the Draft
Statute) on preconditions. Related to this issue, what must be
emphasized is the safeguard contained in article 17 on complementarity.
The ICC would have exercised such universal jurisdiction only where a
national system was unwilling or unable to investigate and/or prosecute
effectively. Therefore, the universal principle would not have divested
national criminal courts of their primary role in prosecutions of listed
crimes.
Clearly, the universal principle would have given jurisdiction to
the ICC if the core crimes were committed in the territory of any state,
whether or not a party to the statute. However, non-state parties would
have been under no international legal obligation to cooperate with the
court. Therefore, the second prong of the German Proposal contained in
article 9(2) Further Option, was that non-state parties may accept the
obligation to cooperate on an ad hoc basis, with respect to any listed
crime.77
2. The United Kingdom Proposal
The United Kingdom 78 in Further Option for article 7(1)
provided for jurisdiction by states parties of the ICC for crimes listed in
article 5, with the same in-built safeguard of complementarity. However,
in article 7(2), where the situation was referred by a state party to the
court or where the prosecutor initiated a prosecution proprio motu, the
further requirement was that both the custodial state and the state where
the crime occurred consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC by being

76 J.F. Bertram-Nothnagel, Report to the Union Internationaledes Avocats, 12 August 1998, 10.
77

Contrast the statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 4, and
Rwanda, supra note 5, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,which obligate all states to
cooperate.
78
U.N. Doc. AIAC.249/WG.3/DP.1.
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states parties. Concern was expressed that acquisition of cumulative
consents would be difficult.79
3. The Korean Proposal
The Republic of Korea's Proposal0 was a compromise position.
Korea did not favour the inherent universal jurisdiction approach of
Germany in that it overlooked the fact that the ICC "is a treaty body to
be created through the consent of States," and that it "is State consent
that justifies the jurisdictional link between the States Parties and the
Court." 81 Neither did it favour the state consent regime to be discussed
below as that would require consent at two stages. The Korean view was
that for the ICC "to be as effective as possible, State consent should be
called for only once, when a State became party to the Statute." Thus, by
becoming a party to the statute a state is considered to have accepted the
jurisdiction of the court. The Korean Proposal viewed this as automatic
rather than inherent jurisdiction. The jurisdictional nexus, therefore, was
that any one or more of four directly involved states have consented to
the ICC exercising jurisdiction over a case by being a state party: either
the territorial state, the custodial state, the state of nationality of the
perpetrator or the state of nationality of the victim. The Korean
Proposal thus distinguished itself from the United Kingdom Proposal by
allowing for selective consent of one of the four states and by a
conceptual difference in that it did not view ICC jurisdiction as based on
universality but on state consent upon ratification or agreement. The
German Delegation supported the Korean initiative and viewed it as
finding "the middle of the road mood of the participants" 8 2 of the
Conference and being "court friendly."83 This proposal enjoyed wide
support but was not popular with those states that had wanted inherent

79 See, for example, Lawyers Com'mittee for Human Rights, "Exercise of ICC Jurisdiction:
The Case for Universal Jurisdiction" (1998) 1:8 Int'l Crim. Ct. Briefing Series 5.
80 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.6, 18 June 1998. A similar proposal had been made earlier by
Sweden: ICJBrief,supra note 63, 4.

81 Conference Monitor,supra note 71, where it states that 18 states supported an opt-in regime.
82 See statement by H.-P. Kaul, Acting Head of the German Delegation in the CW, 9 July

1998; and H.-P. Kaul, "Special Note: Tpe Struggle for the International Criminal Court's
Jurisdiction" (1998) 6 Eur. J. of Crime, Crim. L. & Just. 364 at 369.
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jurisdiction of the ICC without any such consent.8 4 Neither was it
acceptable to many states who wanted a second layer of state consent.8 5
4. State "opt- in" Proposal
This proposal is found in article 6(2), article 7, option 1, and

article 9, option 1 of the Preparatory Committee's Draft Statute that was
before the Rome Conference. This is markedly different from the
previous proposals as it required an actual second consent in addition to
the requirement of being a party to the statute. This declaration of
consent over specified crimes could have been placed at the time of
ratification or at a later stage. The thrust of the proposal was that before
the ICC could assume jurisdiction, as many as five states potentially
would have had to have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
court over the crime in question: the custodial state, the territorial state,
the state that had requested extradition of the person from the custodial
state, unless the request was rejected, the state of nationality of the
accused and the state of nationality of the victim. This approach clearly
would have rendered the ICC ineffective in the majority of cases. The
ICC would have had a narrower competence under this proposal than
states have currently under conventional and customary international
law to prosecute domestically, where the consent of other involved states
is not necessary.8 6
5. Case-by-case Consent Proposal
The case-by-case approach contained in article 7, option 2 of the
draft statute would have needed states to consent for the specific case.
The ICC would in each case have needed the specific consent of the
states outlined above in the opt-in Proposal. Ratification would,
therefore, have had little meaning in practical reality as states would
have been able to render immune from consideration of the court any
individual when it was deemed politically desirable. This proposal would
have rendered the ICC ineffective in many cases.
84 Terra Viva (The Daily Conference Paper at the Rome Conference), "Seoul Floats a
Compromise on Jurisdiction" 22 June 1998, No. 6, 7. See also Conference Monitor,supra note 71, 10
July 1998, 1, where it states that 79 per cent of the states supported the Korean Proposal.

85 Ibid.
86 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 79.
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In effect, both the opt-in and case-by-case proposals would have'
been jurisdiction "Ala carte." In practical terms this would have resulted
in a significantly weakened court with most often the ICC having
jurisdiction only when the United Nations Security Council referred a
situation to it, not to mention the potential problem due to the veto
power of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This
would have been particularly so if both proposals had been adopted and
states had preferred to follow the case-by-case approach. States as a
result could have ratified with no intention of ever allowing cases to go
before the court. This would have created an ineffectual court and as
well would have "foment[ed] selectivity and arbitrariness." 87
6. The United States' Proposal
Insofar as a case was referred to the ICC by a state party or the
prosecutor had initiated an investigation, the United States supported88
article 7, which affirmed that the consent of the territorial state and the
state of nationality of the accused person, or at a minimum only the
consent of the state of nationality, 89 was fundamental. The United States
insisted that the ICC have no jurisdiction over the nationals of states
that had not become a party to the statute. It was argued that to do so
would violate article 34 the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,90 as treaties cannot be binding on non-party third states. The
position was that it would not be acceptable for United States citizens to
be accountable in a court not accepted by the United States. The United
States made. it clear that it could not adhere to a text that allowed for
United States forces operating abroad to be brought even conceivably
before the ICC, even where the United States had not become a party to
the statute. The United States' position was that this would derogate
from its ability to act as a major player in multinational humanitarian
and peacekeeping operations. Protection against frivolous and arbitrary

87 H. Duffy, "Justice in the Balance: Recommendatiuons for an Independent and Effective
International Criminal Court" in W. Taylor, D: PoKempner & M.McClintock, eds., Section B: The
Jurisdiction of the Court (Human Rights Watch, 1998), online: Human Rights Watch,
<wwwhrwatch.org/hrw/ reports98/icc/index.htm#TopOfPage> (date accessed: 14 August 2000).
88 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.70, 14 July 1998.
89 See testimony of Ambassador D. Scheffer, Head of the United States Delegation in Rome,
before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 23 July 1998.
90 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 27 January 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
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charges and other forms of inappropriate investigations and prosecution
was called for. On 16 July 1998 the United States introduced an
amended proposal 9l which concerned article 7 ter in the Bureau
Proposal with respect to acceptance by non-state parties. It provided
that the ICC would only have jurisdiction over such states with respect to
acts committed in their territories or committed by officials or agents of
such states "in the course of official duties and acknowledged by the
State as such, only if the State or States in question have accepted
jurisdiction in accordance with this article." The United States had also
argued for automatic jurisdiction of the court for genocide, but the ICC
had implemented a ten year transitional period following the entry into
force of the statute, during which any state party could opt out of the
court's jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Of course, the United States' position still left open the referral
of a situation by the United Nations Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charteras provided for in article 13(b) of the
statute, subject of course to the veto of one of the five permanent
members of the Security Council. This, in the United States' view, was
the only way to impose the court's jurisdiction on a non-party state.9 2
This proposal would have resulted in an ICC controlled by the Security
Council, a type of permanent ad hoc criminal tribunal.93
This proposal, which contains the indispensable requirement of
the acceptance of the state of nationality of the accused, was not
acceptable to the overwhelming majority of states as it was seen as
causing a probable paralysis of the ICC. The United States' concerns
were not assuaged by the provisions on complementarity contained in
article 17 of the statute or in the provisions in article 98(2) included at
the insistence of the United States, dealing with judicial cooperation that
requires consent of the sending state as a precondition for the surrender
to the ICC by the "host" state of persons present in that state pursuant
to international agreements. 94

91 U.N. Doc. AIConf.183/C.1/L.90, 16 July 1998.
92 Scheffer, supra note 89.
93

J. Podgers, "War Crimes Courts Under Fire" (1998) September A.B.A.J. 64 at 67.

94

See, for example, North Atlantic Status of ForcesAgreements, 1951,1953 Can. T.S. No. 13.
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7. The Bureau Compromise
The Bureau Discussion Paper9S "had narrowed the range of
options but had deliberately taken a cautious approach." 96 The
Proposal 9 7 retained several options. Both of these had dropped the
German Proposal. 98 The Bureau Proposal in article 7(1) adopted the
Korean Proposal for genocide alone. For war crimes and crimes against
humanity, three options were presented in article 7(2): (1) the Korean
Proposal, (2) the acceptance by the territorial and custodial states and
(3) the acceptance by the state of nationality of the accused alone. Some
states voiced strong objections against the Korean Proposal, stating that
it was quasi-universal jurisdiction. It gave the ability to four states
including the custodial state as a state party to give the court jurisdiction.
However, this would in reality have been in keeping with the ability at
international law of the custodial state to prosecute itself for
international crimes, stricto sensu. Other states viewed the other options
as too restrictive, in particular option 3 based on active nationality. As
well, article 7(bis), on acceptance of jurisdiction in both the discussion
paper for treaty crimes (and possibly for one or more of the core crimes)
and in Option 2 of the Proposal for crimes against humanity and war
crimes, was controversial because it replicated the opt-in regime. Article
7(bis) in Option 1 reproduced the automatic jurisdiction over all core
crimes by states parties. Thus, as late as 10 July 1998, with only one week
left, there was no consensus. The United States and other states
emphasized that "universal jurisdiction or any variant of it" was
unacceptable. 99
The result was the introduction into the final package by the
Bureau of a new article on preconditions on 17 July 1998, the present
article 12 in the statute. It reads:

95 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53, 6 July 1998,11-13.
96 Kirsch & Holmes, supra note 39, at 9.
97

U.N. Doc. AICONF.183/C.I/L.59, 10 July 1998,10-12.

98 According to Conference Monitor, supra note 71, 10 July 1998, 2, "23 states displayed their

dismay that universal jurisdiction was not reflected." Note also the reaction of the German
Delegation, as expressed in a statement by H.-P. Kaul, Acting Head of Delegation in the CW, 9 July

1998, which was also one of dismay and reiterated the belief that their approach was legally sound
"and acknowledged in international legal doctrine as well as through extensive state practice": see
statement by H.-P. Kaul, supra note 82, 370.

99 P. Kirsch, "The Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court: A Comment" Nov.
- Dec. 1998 A.S.I.L. Newsletter, online: American Society of International Law, <www.asil.org
/newsletter/novdec98/home.htm > (date accessed: 14 August 2000).
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Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction:
I.

A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction

of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.

2.

In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its

jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have

accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a)

The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred

or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of
registration of that vessel or aircraft:
(b)
The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.

3.

If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required

under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the

exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The accepting
State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in accordance with

Part 9.

This article combines state acceptance of jurisdiction for the crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression when
defined, with preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC, in
cases where a situation is referred to the prosecutor by a state party or
where the prosecutor has initiated an investigation proprio motu. It
allows by state parties the disjunctive acceptance of one or more of the
territorial state or the state of nationality of the accused. The
transitional provision contained in article 124 was also part of the
accomodation made to gain France's agreement to the statute.
As discussed above, this complex and controversial issue
resulted in a compromise put to the Committee of the Whole in the final
package. The compromise was between the "like-minded states," who
had for the most part a preference for inherent jurisdiction or for a list
of alternative states (territorial state, state of nationality of the accused
or the victim, and the custodial state) where it was sufficient that one
had accepted the jurisdiction of the court by ratifying, and the "non-likeminded states." The latter insisted on either state party acceptance of
the state of nationality of the accused or the even stricter requirement
that there be acceptance conjunctively from a list of states as had been
proposed in the ILC draft statute 00 Article 12 as adopted by the
conference is the accommodation that was struck. It reduced the
preconditions to the territorial state or the state of nationality of the

100 At the outset of the Conference many delegations including China, France, India, Mexico,
and several non-aligned states had supported the "state consent" proposal, requiring consent even
from states parties for each prosecution.
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accused being stat~s parties. These are the two primary bases of
jurisdiction over the offence in international criminal law. 01
a) State with territorialjuisdiction
The territorial basis of jurisdiction is a manifestation of state
sovereignty.1 02 A state has plenary jurisdiction over persons, property,
and conduct occurring in its territory, subject only to obligations or
limitations imposed by international law.103 This is the main working
rule in international criminal law. The territory of a state includes its
land mass, internal waters, the twelve nautical mile territorial sea, and
the airspace above all of the former. Jurisdiction is recognized under
customary and conventional international law as also extending to
conduct committed on board maritime vessels and aircraft registered in
a state.10 4 Thus if a listed crime is committed in State A, a state party to
the Rome Statute by a national of State B, whether or not State B is a
state party, State A will have enabled the ICC to take jurisdiction,
whether the alleged offender is present in State A or in another
custodial state party.l05 The ICC is not, as has been argued by the
United States, therefore taking jurisdiction potentially over non-state
101 The various United Nations conventions dealing with international terrorism use these
bases of jurisdiction along with passive personality and the presence of the accused (custodial state)
to allow for extradition or prosecution by domestic criminal courts: see InternationalConvention

Againstthe Taking of Hostages, 17 December 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205, article 6 [hereinafter Hostages
Convention]; and InternationalConvention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 15 December

1997, U.N. Doe. A/RES/52/164, article 6.
102 Compania Naviera Vascongado v. Steamship Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485 at 496-97. The ambit

of the territorial principle has been interpreted in some domestic courts to allow for criminal
prosecution when a significant portion of the elements, if not all, of the crime occur in the state. It is
a real and substantial-link test that is applied and it is in accord with the principle of international
comity: see Libman v. R, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178.
103 See NorthAtlantic Status of ForcesAgreement, 1951, 1953 Can. T.S. No. 13; and Exchange
of Letters Constitutingan Agreement Bewteen the UnitedNations and the Government of the Republic

of Cyprus Concerningthe Status of the UnitedNations Peace-KeapingForce in Cyprus, 31 March 1964,
492 U.N.T.S. 57.

104 See, for example, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (1988), in 27 International Legal Materials 672, article 6(1)(a). Note L. Sadat

Wexler, ed., "Model Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court" (1998) 13 Nouvelles
Etudes Penales 25, includes also the state of registration of space craft or space stations.
105 Once the preconditions of ICC, supra note 1, article 12(2) have been met other states
parties are obliged to cooperate with the ICC: see C. Kress, "Article 86," in 0. Trifterrer, supra note

35, 1051, on the general obligation to cooperate; and C. Kress & K. Prost, "Article 89," in 0.
Trifterrer, supra note 35, 1071, on the surrender of persons to the court.

20001

The InternationalCriminalCourt

parties. It is not violating article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.1 0 6 On a domestic level, it is accepted that when an alien
commits a crime, whether a domestic common crime or an international
crime, on the territory of another state, a prosecution in the latter state
is not dependent on consent of the state of nationality or its being a state
party to a pertinent treaty criminalizing the conduct.10 7 It is thus not a
case of a non-state party being bound, but rather the individual being
amenable to the jurisdiction of the ICC because of alleged crimes
committed in the territory of a state party.
b) State of nationalityof the accused
The active nationality basis of jurisdiction over the offence is well
entrenched in the domestic law of the majority of states. By virtue of
such state practice and opinio juris it is a permissive rule derived from
international custom that establishes extraterritorial jurisdiction.1 08 Civil
law countries provide for its use extensively and relate it to common
crimes of a domestic nature as well as to crimes against the common
interests of states. It is a corollary to their rules concerning the
non-extradition of nationals. Common law states, on the other hand, use
it almost exclusively for international crimes that comprise the core
crimes in article 5 of the Rome Statute and international treaty crimes
such as are contained in the international terrorism conventions. 109 They
have not, however challenged its use more generally by other states.
c) Non-stateparties
In the case of non-state parties article 12(3) follows the ILC draft
statute, the Preparatory Committee draft statute, 110 and the Bureau
106 ienna Convention,supra note 90.
107 See, for example, U.S. v. Fawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991), where the United
States prosecuted for hijacking and hostage-taking that occurred in Lebanon on the basis of the

passive personality principle. Lebanon, the state of nationality of the accused was not a party to the
Hostages Convention, supra note 101, or the 1970 Hague Conventionfor the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure ofAircraft, 16 December 1970,860 U.N.T.S. 105.
108 The Steamship Lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927), P.C.I.J. Ser. No. 10.
109 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
ProtectedPersons,including DiplomaticAgents, 14 December 1973, 1977 Canada T.S. No. 43, article

3(l)(b).
110 See article 7(4), article 9, option 1, para.3, option 2, para. 4, and further option para. (2).
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Discussion Paper111 and Proposal112 in providing that such a state, if its
acceptance is required under the preceding paragraph may declare ad
hoc its acceptance with respect to the crime in question.113 Such a state
is then obligated to cooperate with the ICC in accordance with Part 9 of
the statute. Thus, the statute does not infringe upon the sovereignty of
non-party states and is in compliance with customary and conventional
rules on the law of treaties. It is, therefore, a misconception that the
statute binds non-parties. Rather, it uses the traditionally accepted
territorial and active nationality bases of jurisdiction over the offence
coupled with the additional ad hoc consent process in this paragraph.
Those states that had lobbied for the opt-in acceptance and the
preconditional conjunctive approach or the state of nationality of the
accused alone remained opposed. From the outset issues of jurisdiction
had been a key concern for the United States. 114 For the United States,
it was the four words "one or more of' that caused the ultimate dissent.
It was on this issue that the United States proposed an amendment
during the last hours of the Conference in the Committee of the Whole.
The amendment was similar to an earlier United States proposal
discussed above.1 15 The amendment was resoundingly defeated by a
no-action motion.116 In the plenary session that followed immediately,
the United States requested an unrecorded vote. The result was 120
votes in favour, to 7 against, with 21 abstentions. Those voting against
the motion included China, Israel, and the United States.117
V. CONCLUSION
The text of article 12 is a product of compromise. It endeavours
to satisfy the many interests that were in operation in the Rome
Conference and before. The content is far from perfect but was all that
was possible at the time. It is a serious gap that the acceptance of the

111 Article 7 ter.
112 Article 7 ter.
113 ICC,supra note 1, article 12(3).
114 Conference Monitor,supra note 71, 18 July 1998, No. 26,2.
115

U.N. Doe. A/CONF.183/C.1/L90.

116 The motion was proposed by Norway. Sweden and Denmark spoke for the motion and
China and Qatar against it. The motion was adopted with 113 in favour, and 17 against, with 25
abstaining: see ICC, supra note 1, article 7(1)(g) read in accordance with article 7(2)(0.

117 Only these three states publicly stated that they voted against and gave their reasons.
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statute by the custodial state does not act as a precondition for the
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.118 It is this provision that would have
ensured that atrocities will not go unpunished if the territorial state or
state of nationality are not parties or do not consent ad hoc and there is
no United Nations Security Council referral. In all probability it may be
assumed that the states likely to be the places where such crimes will be
committed or whose nationals are suspect will not be among the first to
ratify or otherwise agree to be bound by the statute. Initially, at least
once the ICC is operative, after the 60 ratifications have been deposited,
reliance will have to be in the hands of the Security Council.
Unfortunately, article 12 means that the ICC lacks inherent universal
jurisdiction (the German Proposal) or automatic jurisdiction (the
Korean Proposal), for it requires the acceptance of the custodial state as
a state party. It is ironic that many states that had initially promoted
strict preconditions for the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction were
adamant after article 12 passed that the article lacks universal and
automatic jurisdiction.]1 9 The result is that the ICC does indeed have
less jurisdiction than domestic courts of any state would have as a result
of not adopting the German or Korean Proposal to prosecute persons
accused of the core crimes.
It is safe to say that the ICC will come into operation within the
next two years or so. As of October 2000 there are 114 states that have
signed and 21 that have ratified, including Canada.120 Now that the rules
of evidence and procedure and elements of crimes have been completed
since 30 June 2000, it seems certain that many more states will ratify. As
well, apart from awaiting the conclusion of the Preparatory Commission
established since Rome on these issues, many states are in the process of
enacting domestic legislation, or as a preliminary step debating what is,
in substance, involved in order to be able to fulfill their obligations to

118 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, "The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal
Court: A Brief Summary of the Main Issues," 2:1 International Criminal Court Briefing Series,

online: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights <www.lchr.org/icc/v2nlprin.htm> (date accessed: 15
August 2000).
119
T. Meron, "The Court We Want" Washington Post (13 October 1998), reprinted in A.S.I.L.
Newsletter Nov.-Dec. 1998, 9, online: American Society of International Law, <www.asil.org
/newsletter/novdec98/home.htm> (date accessed: 14 August 2000); and D. Scheffer, "Americas's
Stake in Peace, Security and Justice," Sept.-Oct. 1998 A.S.I.L. Newsletter, online: American Society
of International Law, <www.asil.org /newsletter/septoct98/home.htm> (date accessed: 14 August

2000).
120 Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago, San Marino, Italy, Fiji, Ghana, Norway, Belize, Belgium,
Botswana, Canada, France, Gabon, Iceland, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mali, New Zealand, Sierra
Leone, Venezuela, and Takjikistan have already ratified the agreement.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 38 No. 2

cooperate with the ICC in good faith. This process necessarily takes
time. In some states it requires not ordinary domestic legislation but
constitutional change. Among the contentious issues are the surrender
to the ICC of nationals by those states that ordinarily do not extradite
such persons, the negation of immunity of heads of state, other high
ranking government officials, and even members of parliament and the
acceptance of life imprisonment as a penalty.
In the Preparatory Commission sessions during 1999 and March
and June 2000, the United States together with other participating states
worked actively and constructively. Suggestions made after Rome that
the preconditions to jurisdiction could be changed by the states parties
in a "binding interpretative statement" were not pressed. 121 This was
also the case with the suggestion that a declarative statement could be
made whereby third party jurisdiction would be suspended in the case
where the state of nationality of the alleged offender is both able and
willing to assume responsibility for criminal conduct which amounted to
an official act. 122 This would, it has been argued, have simply moved "the
problem from the level of individual responsibility to that of exclusive
state responsibility" and consequently involve "a total change of the
parameters of responsibility" 12 3 that were envisaged in Rome. The
United States appeared to have realized that to seek an amendment of
the Rome Statute to abrogate the perceived problem that it has with
article 12 was unrealistic and would not meet with support. However,
before the March 2000 Preparatory Commission, the United States
made a ddmarche to other states in their capitals in which it recalled that
it had identified in its mind a number of flaws in the statute, but it was
of the view that they could be dealt with in the rules of evidence and
procedure and elements of crimes. It reiterated its fundamental
difficulty with article 12 and how it would make it nearly impossible for
the United States to give the ICC any measure of support if the statute
remained as it is. It focussed its concerns again on the official decisions
of a sovereign non-state party being subjected to the jurisdiction of the
court in cases where states that oppose United States' actions abroad
make unfounded accusations. However, it was also the position of the
United States that it shared the concern of other states that any
provision dealing with the consent of such a non-state party should not
121 R. Wedgewood, "The International Criminal Court: An American View" (1999) 10 Eur. J.
Int'l L. 93 at 102.
122 Ibid.
123 G. Hafner, K Boon, A. Rfibesame & J. Huston, "A Response to the American View as

Presented by Ruth Wedgewood" (1999) 10 Eur. J. Int'l L. 108 at 119.
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act as a vehicle for the alleged perpetrators of grave atrocities to escape
justice before the new court. This concern is indeed valid, but it is
difficult to envisage how distinctions can be drawn between non-state
parties, so-called "rogue" states or otherwise. All non-state parties could
use the United States argument. What the United States was promoting
was a clarification of the preconditions issue in a supplemental
document to the Rome Statute and in a rule of procedure. The
supplemental document envisaged was the Relationship Agreement
Between the United Nations and the ICC. This Relationship Agreement
did not have to completed on 30 June 2000. However, the rules of
procedure and evidence had to be and were in fact so completed, by
general agreement. 124 The United States did not at that juncture
formally tabje such a proposal but rather informally circulated it at the
March session. The proposal for the procedural rule related to article
98(2) of the statute dealing with cooperation and consent to surrender to
the ICC. Article 98(2) reads:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements

pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State

for the giving of consent for the surrender.

The United States proposal required an addition to the rule of
procedure to article 98. The currently informal proposal reads:
The Court shall proceed with a request for surrender or an acceptance of a person into
the custody of the Court only in a manner consistent with its obligations under the
relevant international instrument.

This then related to a future proposal by the United States for the
supplemental document to be included in the Relationship Agreement
Between the United Nations and the ICC which would utilize the
possibility presented in the above proposal to the rules of procedure.
This proposal read:
The United Nations and the International Criminal Court agree that the Court may seek
the surrender or accept custody of a national who acts within the sovereign direction of a

U.N. Member State, and such directing State has so acknowledged, only in the event (a)
the directing State is a State Party to the Statute or the Court obtains the consent of the

directing State, or (b) measures have been authorized pursuant to Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter against the directing State in relation to the situation or actions giving rise
to the alleged crime or crimes, provided that in connection with such authorization the

Security Council has determined that this subsection shall apply.

124 See U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.3/Rev.1; and U.N. Doc PCNICC/2000/INF/4/Add.1-2.
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This was acutely controversial. Relying on an overly wide
interpretation of article 98(2), that would have meant that international
agreements would have included not only bilateral extradition treaties
between states and States of Forces Agreements, but also agreements
entered into by the ICC itself. The position on this later articulated by
the United States at the June session was that the statute did not limit
the relevant agreement and such are yet to be envisaged and negotiated.
Obviously, the best case scenario is for the United States to become a
state party. Nevertheless, although many states want to keep the United
States positively engaged in the process of bringing the ICC into
operation, among the like-minded states and others there were definite
concerns, notably not wanting the delicate balance achieved in Rome to
be circumvented through an oblique back-door rule of procedure to be
followed at some later stage by the Relationship Agreement article. In
reality, the end result would be that the ICC would only have jurisdiction
with the consent of the state of nationality of the accused or the United
Nations Security Council. The United States proposal appeared to
remove or at least restrict the jurisdictional provision concerning the
state where the offence was committed. As was discussed earlier, article
12 is in fact much narrower than what most states wanted in Rome and
the proposal to produce a "procedural fix" to enable the United States
to cooperate with the ICC, at a minimum as a "good neighbour" 25
created more concerns about further restrictions. Furthermore, there
will be implications if war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed "within the sovereign direction of a U.N. Member State" are
not in accord with the principle of international law as encapsulated in
the Nuremberg Principles, which affirm that the "act of state" plea is no
defence.
The mandate of the Preparatory Commission is not to revise the
Rome Statute but to elaborate on it and thereby to encourage general
support by states. The rules of procedure and evidence must be
consistent with the statute. Actual amendments to the statute can only
be done by a review conference of the Assembly of States Parties after
the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of the statute.126
Another major fear was that the United States' proposal would
encourage certain states not to ratify as it would give them the power to
block the ICC's jurisdiction and that it would also negate a key
compromise in Rome concerning the role of the Security Council in that
125 Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, as reported in The Desert News [Salt
Lake City] (6 May 2000) A4.
126 ICC, supra note 1, article 121.
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the ICC would be subject to the veto of the five permanent members of
the Security Council over prosecutions of non-state party nationals,
which would undermine the legitimacy of the court as an impartial and
independent judicial body.
Thus, the major problem was how to accommodate the concerns
of the United States without undermining the integrity, credibility and
effectiveness of the ICC. With such a "procedural fix," the United States
indicated that its "good neighbour policy" towards the ICC could
"mature over the years into the real possibility of signature and
7
ratification." 12
At the Preparatory Commission in June 2000 the United States
formally introduced its proposal but concentrated solely on the addition
to the rule of procedure for article 98(2). The United States position as
presented in the debate was that the proposal for Rule 9.19(2) was "a
separate and distinct proposal," which "stood on its own merits" and
"should not be interpreted as requiring or in any way calling for the
negotiation of provisions in any particular international agreement by
128
the Court or any other international organization or State."
The June proposal by the United States was refined and stated to
stand alone and separate from any provision in the Relationship
Agreement to be negotiated at the 27 November 2000 - 8 December
2000 session. Many other delegations regarded this as in contradiction to
the two-step United States March proposal. The accomodation that was
struck in the final days of the June session to resolve the concerns of the
United States was contained in Rule 9.19(2) which provides:
The Court may not proceed with a request for the surrender of a person without the
consent of a sending State, if under article 98, paragraph 2, such a request would be
inconsistent with obligations under an international agreement pursuant to which the
consent of a sending State is required prior to the surrender of a person of that State to
12 9
the Court.

At the insistance of the European Union and the like-minded
group of states, there was included an understanding in the Proceedings
of the Preparatory Commission's June session that Rule 9.19 should be
interpreted not to require or in any way call for the negotiation of
provisions in any agreement by the court itself or by another

127 Statement of Ambassador David Scheffer, as reported in The DesertNews [Salt Lake City]
(6 May 2000) A4.
128 U.S. Statement on Proposed Rule 9.19(2) by Amb. D. Scheffer, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/200/WGRPE(9)DP. 4, 19 June 2000.
12 9

U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGRPE/L.14/Add.2.
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international organ or state. This was viewed as a carefully balanced
means of getting around a very difficult issue. As was discussed earlier,
the rules of evidence and procedure cannot change the Rome Statute
itself and in the event of any conflict, the Rome Statute will prevail. This
is implicit in the reference in Rule 9.19(2) to article 98 of the Rome
Statute. The rules of evidence and procedure are "an instrument for the
application of the Rome Statute ... to which they are subordinate in all
cases." 130
This accomodation enabled the United States to be a party to the
consensus adoption of the rules of evidence and procudure at the
culmination of the June 2000 session. However, the future path is far
from uncertain. At the upcoming Preparatory Commission session in
New York that runs from 27 November 2000 to 8 December 2000, it is
apparent that the United States will return to the table to negotiate an
exception by way of the Relationship Agreement between the court and
the United Nations. It remains to be seen how other states will react to,
and deal with this. At the present time it is difficult to envisage how a
resolution of this issue will be achieved.
This being said, the momentum is building and efforts worldwide
are being made to ensure ratification and domestic implementation and
consequent early entry into force of the Rome Statute. It would be an
affront to humanity, the international rule of law and to the modern
struggle since 1947 to establish a permanent international criminal court,
if it was to be rendered a nullity by procedural manoeuvres.

130 U.N.Doc. PCNICC/2000JINF/3/Add.1, 12 July 2000, 1.

